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Fox and reported in volume 258 of the Pacific Reporter beginning at page 1079 I would reverse the judgment and thus uphold the action of the board in denying the license.
Edmonds, J., and Schauer, ,J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 28,
1954. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

[Crim. No. 5532.

In Bank.

Apr. 2, 1954.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JAMES FRANKLIN
WOLFE et al., Appellants.
[1] Criminal Law- Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of
Prosecuting Attorney.-It was not prejudicial misconduct for
prosecuting attorney in a murder case to ask defendant if he
left his knife in victim's back, where there was no objection by
defense counsel nor any motion to strike, and where jury was
instructed that it was sole judge of value and effect of evidence, that it could not convict defendant on mere suspicion,
that prosecution was bound to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that, unless it did so, it was jury's
duty to find defendant not guilty.
[2] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-While it was highly improper for prosecuting attorney
in a murder case to comment, in his closing argument to jury,
on failure to produce certain witnesses and to state that the
witnesses, if produced, would have been too honest to perjure
themselves for defendants and afraid to testify for the People,
such misconduct was not so prejudicial to defendants as to
result in a miscarriage of justice where evidence of their guilt
was overwhelming. ( Const., art. VI, § 4:lj2 .)
[3] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error- Instructions- Confessions.Refusal to instruct jury in a murder case that a confession
must be free and voluntary did not result in prejudice to defendants where, on being questioned immediately after crime,
they insisted that the killing was done because deceased was
out to "get" them, where court reporter, who was present at
time, testified that defendants' statements were not made
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, §§ 1404(8), 1407(5);
[2] Criminal Law, § 1404(18); [3] Criminal Law, § 1434; [4]
Homicide, §§ 189, 190; [5] Criminal Law, § 734; [6] Homicide,
§ 222.
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under any promise and that no threat or force was used on
either of them, wherr; questions and answers were then read
to jury without objection by defense counsel, where defendants
testifit>d at trial in same \'ein as answers they had given just
after commission of crime, where no instruction as to admissions and confessions was requested by defense, and where
evidence was sufficient, independently of confessions or admission, to sustain verdict.
[4a, 4b] Homicide- Instructions- Manslaughter: Second Degree
Murder.-Failure to give an instruction in a homicide case as
to manslaughter or provocation sufficient to reduce crime from
murder to manslaughter or from first degree murder to second
degree murder was not error where it appeared, from defendants' own story that they had discussed killing deceased the
night before crime was committed and again on day of crime
just before breakfast, that crime was either first degree murder
or a homicide committed in self-defense, where there was no
evidence of a sudden quarrel or any such passion as would
make doubtful the formation of a deliberate and premeditated
intent to kill, and where jury was adequately instructed on law
of self-defense and fear necessary to justify a homicide, as
well as on law applicable to both first and second degree
murder.
[5] Criminal Law-Instructions- Requisites.-Instructions must
be responsive to issues which are determined by the evidence.
[6] Homicide-Instructions-Self-defense.-Evidence in a homicide case as to a quarrel on day before the killing, together
with evidence showing that deceased had procured a knife
and had threatened to kill defendants, justifies an instruction
on self-defense.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b) ) , from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County and from orders denying a new trial. Raymond T. Coughlin, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of murder in first
degree imposing death penalty, affirmed.
Anthony J. Scalora, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Appellants.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier,
Deputy Attorney General, J. Francis 0 'Shea, District Attorney (Sacramento), and Edward L. McCarthy, Deputy
District. Attorney, for Respondent.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 62; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 554 et seq.
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CARTER, J.-Defendants James 1'-,ranklin Wolfe and Joseph ,Johansen, while confined in Folsom State Prison serving
life sentences, were charged by indictment with the murder,
on May 8, 1953, of one Harold Stricker, also an inmate of
Folsom, and in Count II with a violation of section 4500 of
the Penal Code. 'l'hey entered pleas of not guilty, and not
guilty by reason of insanity, to Count I, and trial by jury
was ordered. Subsequently, the plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity was withdrawn, and Count II was, upon motion,
set aside. After trial by jury a verdict of murder of the first
degree was returned as to both defendants and the penalty
was fixed at death. Defendants' motions for a new trial were
denied. The appeal is automatic (Pen. Code, § 1239 (b)).
On May 7, 1953, Stricker and Johansen had an argument
over a game of dominoes. Stricker, at that time, was apparently very angry and threatened to s1ap and strike Johansen,
and to ''get'' both Johansen and his cellmate, \Volfe, if they
came out in the yard the next morning. Stricker called both
defendants vile names and told Johansen he would ''slap the
. . . out of him.'' That night in their cell both defendants
talked the matter over; another inmate informed them that
Stricker had a knife and '.vas going to ''get'' both of them
the next morning. Defendants discussed getting knives with
which to kill Stricker; the possibility of being caught at it and
receiving the death penalty was discussed between them. They
testified that they had decided that, despite the penalty, they
thought it was better to get Stricker before he got them. The
next morning they procured knives from an unidentified source
and, after again talking it over, walked around the prison yard
watching Stricker who was playing dominoes. The only conversation defendants had with Stricker that morning was
when Wolfe asked him if he were going to play dominoes and
Stricker's reply that he was. They testified that they saw
Stricker go in one of the prison buildings and come out with
a jacket on ; that they thought he had gotten a knife ; that they
walked around and finally decided they would get Stricker
before he got tl1em. The defendants approached Stricker, who
was sitting down with his bark toward them, and between the
two of them stabbed Jlim some seven times. Medical trstimony
siJow<'d that ally one. of ihe:'e knife. wo11nds could have eaused
deatli. ,1ohansell 's knife was foUlH1 in the back of the deeeased.
Several g-uanls were present at the time of the crime and testified to the manner in which defendants stabbed Stricker, and
that no knife was found in Stricker's possession. Defendants
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knew the
were there and watching
testified that
decided it was better to
Stricker at that
them; that
time because if
with the knives it would
' and that Stricker
would then build up his
for violence by saying they
were "weak" and "scared" and that when they got out of
segregation, he would still
them. Several inmates testified
to the domino
on the 7th and that Stricker's reputation for violence was bad and that he was very belligerent.
Defendants argue that the
attorney was guilty
of
misconduct in two instances.
Their first
contention that it was
error for the prosecution to ask defendant Johansen if he left his knife in the
victim's
is without merit. The deputy district attorney
asked
" [W] hat
to your knife?" to which
''It was left in the victim's back.'' The
next question was, ''Did you leave it in the victim's back Y''
to which defendant Johansen
"Yes." There was no
nor was there any motion to
objection
defense
strike. It is next
that the use of the quoted expression assumes the
of the defendant. People v. Williams
( 1860), 17 Cal.
relied upon
defendants is not in point.
There, the trial
in instructing the jury, said, ''The
fact that the deceased was a Chinaman gave the defendant
no more
to take his life than if he had been a white
person; nor did the fact, if you so find, that the defendant
was
to enforce the collection of taxes against another
Chinaman, or even
give the defendant
any right to take his life . . . . " (Emphasis added.) This
court, in reversing, held that the instruction assumed that
the deceased was
killed when that very issue was
involved and that ''even an equivocal expression coming from
the judge, may be fatal to the prisoner." (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the expression did not come from the
judge, but from the
attorney without objection
by defense counsel or motion to strike being made, and the
jury was instructed that it was the sole judge of the value
and effect of the evidence ; that it could not convict a defendant upon mere
; that the prosecution was
"bound to establish the
of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and unless the prosecution does so, then it is
your duty to find the defendant not guilty."
[2] The second instance in which the prosecution is said
to be guilty of prejudicial misconduct was in the closing

1954]

PEOPLE V. WOLFE
[42 C.2d 6G3; 268 P.2d 475]

667

ment was made over
that it constituted
in relation to that

the name of Jack Garner was
were
all together when this
not Mr. [ G] arner brought down
to what occurred, to testify as to
seated right at the table there. Is it
ladies and gentlethat he wouldn't come
men, that Mr. Garner was honest
down and
himself? Is it
that that is the
reason that he was not
the defense f Why
didn't the People
them down'?
ladies and gentletestify on behalf
men, hgw many convicts do you think
of the People in a case like this? How many convicts do you
think are
to risk their lives in order to see justice
done? You know that they are few and far between, and
you know that if any man, any convict came down here and
testified against Mr. Wolfe and Johansen he would be setting
himself up for a knife in his own back. You know that because you know as common,
that a stoolie,
his fellow convict is
a man who informs or testifies
man among convicts.
the most hated, the most
"Ladies and Gentlemen, I wonder if
Farrington
was actually one of the four who were seated at that table
playing dominoes that afternoon. I
wonder about that.
Mr. Johansen said that the people who were playing when
that argument took
where Mr. Garner, Mr. Stricker
himself, and a man called Whitey Knoles [sic]. Whitey
Knoles~now, Knoles is not
like 'Farrington.' It
is altogether different. He couldn't make a mistake like that.
If Farrington were actually the one who were playing, he
couldn't have done it, ladies and
So I seriously
put it to you, was
Farrington actually seated at that
table. Does he know anything about it at all1 And if he
was playing, what about the rest of the convicts who came
down and testified? Ladies and Gentlemen, there is testimony here that a man by the name of Clark was assaulted
by Mr. Stricker the same day.
was not Mr. Clark
brought down to testify as to-- [Objection by defense
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counsel that such a procedure would have been improper to
which the Court replied that the
wonld decide strictly
in accordanee with the (widenee j. '' 'rhe reputation of Mr.
Stricker must have been known to Mr. Clark as a fellow
inmate. 'rhe reputation of Mr. Stricker, ladies and gentlemen, must have been known also to Tex Goodman. Why
wasn't he brought down 'I . . . [Cited by defense counsel
as prejudicial misconduct to which the Court replied that
it was instructing the jury to decide the case strictly in accordance with the evidence.] Ladies and Gentlemen, where
are the men that Stricker was allegedly talking to on May
8th, the three men that Mr. Johansen says he knows but he
doesn't know their names? vVhy weren't they brought down?
Why didn't the people bring any of these men down? Well,
I think I have explained that to you pretty clearly
already . . . . "
Defendants contend that this argument told the jury that
had certain witnesses appeared they would have testified
for the People but if they had so done, they wouTd have
risked being killed by their fellow convicts. It has been held
prejudicial misconduct and prejudicially erroneous for the
prosecution to comment on the failure of a witness to appear
and that had he done so, he would have testified in a certain
manner or to facts not in evidence (People v. Kirkes, 39
Cal.2d 719 [249 P.2d 1] ; People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d 242
[246 P.2d 636]; People v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334 [83 P. 43];
People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650 [112 P. 281] ; People v. Srnith,
121 Cal. 355 [53 P. 802] ) . Part of the argument here was
directed toward the failure of the defense to ·produce a
witness who was allegedly playing dominoes with Stricker
and defendant Johansen on the day before the crime. It
was said he was too honest to perjure himself by testifying
for the defense that StrickeJ;" had made a threat against the
lives of the two defendants and that he was afraid to testify
for the prosecution because of what might thereafter happen
to him at the hands of his fellow prisoners. Another part
of the argument was to the effect that two prisoners whom
the defense claimed Stricker had assaulted (in an endeavor
to show the reputation of the deceased for violence was bad)
were not produced as witnesses; still another part of the
argument questioned whether one Farrington, who was a
witness, had really been present at the time as he said he
was or whether, as testified to by~Johansen, it had been one
Whitey Forbes (referred to in the argument as Whitey
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Knoles). There was testimony by an inmate that "Whitey"
and "Marty" Farrington were the same person. Whether
or not Marty Farrington and vVhitey were the same person
was a question of fact for the jury since the testimony on
the subject did nothing more than create a conflict in the
evidence. It was, however, highly improper for the prosecution to comment on the failure to produce certain witnesses
and to state that the witnesses, if produced, would have
been too honest to perjure themselves for the defendants
and afraid to testify for the People. Such conduct should
not be condoned, and is not here approved. Had the People
desired to have the men alluded to produced as witnesses,
the procednre common in such cases was open. It is only
because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case
that we do not declare such misconduct sufficiently prejudicial
to warrant a reversal. But we cannot say, after an examination of the entire cause, that the remarks of the prosecuting
attorney were so prejudicial to defendants as to result in a
miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4:Y2 ; People v.
Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 659 [140 P.2d 828); People v. Estorga,
206 Cal. 81 [273 P. 575] ; People v. Adams, 92 Oal.App. 6
[267 P. 906] .)
It is next contended that the trial court erred in failing
to give certain requested instructions. [3] The :first assignment of error is that the court refused to instruct the jury
that a confession must be free and voluntary. Immediately
after the killing, defendants were taken to a room controlled
by prison officials before a member of the district attorney's
staff, a detective and a court reporter. Both defendants
answered questions concerning· the events of May 7th and
8th ; both defendants insisted that the killing was done because Stricker was out to ''get'' them. Merrick, the court
reporter present, testified upon questioning by the prosecution
that the defendants' statements were not made under any
promise and that no threat or force was used on either of
them. The questions and answers were then read to the
jury without objeetion by defense counsel. Both defendants
testified at the trial and their testimony covered the same
subject matter as that which is now objected to as a confession involuntarily given. ·while it would have been better
practice to have instructed the jury as to admissions and
confessions, no such instruction was requested by the defense,
although it waR requested by the People. In view of the
fact that defendants testified at the trial in the same vein as
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the answers
after the commission of the
crime and defense counsel testified that he had no objection
to the
of the
of defendants' statements,
could have resulted from the failure to so inv.
30 Oal.2d
530 [183
witness was examined for the purpose
the defendants' confession had been volunthat there had
no coercion
no violence. The trial
court there refused to instruct the
that it was its province
to determine whether the confession had been freely and
voluntarily
We held that the stipulation ''in the
absence of
circumstances, removes from controversy the question of coercion." It was pointed out that there,
as here, the
was instructed
that it was the judge
of the
of the witnesses and of the
of the
evidence. In the case at
the jury was also instructed
that oral admissions or statements made by a defendant at a
time when he was not under oath and not testifying as a
witness in the case were to be viewed with caution because
he might not have understood the questions and for ''other
reasons." In the Barnes case we held that "It would have
been better practice to instruct them [members of the jury]
that they were the exclusive judges as to whether or not
the confession was true
distinguished from its voluntary
character]. . . . The failure of the court to give such an
instruction,
did not
defendant." vVe
there concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the verdict independently of the confession. (See, also, People
v. Httrst, 36 Oal.App.2d 63 [96 P.2d 1003] .) There is merit
in the People's
in the case at bar, the defendant's pretrial statements constituted admissions rather than
confessions in that
at all times, insisted that the
killing had been clone in self-defense. In People v. Fowler,
178 Cal. 657, 666 [174 P.
, the court after commenting
upon the evidence, said: ''Thus the statement itself would
show that the
was done by defendant in his lawful
self-defense. Such an admission, as we have shown, is not
a confession of the
or an acknowledgment of guilt
thereof. It is a declaration of innocence; that no crime was
committed; that the
of Duree was a justifiable homicide
and not murder or
"
also, People v.
Arnold, 108 Oal.App.2d
723 [239 P.2d 449] ; People v.
Cryder, 90 Cal.App.2d 194, 203 [202 P.2d 765] .) Aside
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30 Cal.
of the
an instruction on
was instructed on first and second
defense; on ,n,,nr•<~
UHQC•v.u; on '1W;Hvv,
appear that there was
both express and
no evidence in the record to
an instruction on manshowed that there was no
slaughter. Defendants'
sudden
or heat of pm;sicm at the time of the crime
so as to
an instruction on
'"".,."""" manslaughter;
the crime itself
that there was sufficient evidence
to show that an instruction on
would have been
In People v.
748 [297 P. 23], the court,
in commenting on
's refused instruction on
"In the instant case,
the demanslaughter,
fendant offered neither
nor evidence as to any fact which
the defendant guilty
would have justified the jury in
only of manslaughter. The only justification which the defendant offered for his otherwise deliberate and premeditated
murder was the plea of self-defense. If the jury found that
his testimony with regard to that
was wholly unsupported and unbelievable it had no other alternative than that
of finding him guilty of a
unprovoked and cold-blooded
murder. Under such circumstances the authorities fully sustain the trial court in refusing to give to the jury an instruction concerning or
manslaughter. [Citations. J"
(People v. Sutw, 41 Cal.2d 483,
494 [261 P.2d 241] ;
People v. Atwlde, 24 Oal.2d
188 [148 P.2d 627].)
Defendants argue that the jury should have been instructed that adequate provocation may reduce an intentional killing from murder to
and that it may
also raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the members
of the jury that the defendants formed the intent to kill and
carried it out after deliberation and premeditation. Defendants rely upon People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121 [169 P.2d
1], for the proposition that " . . . the existence of provocation which is not 'adequate' to reduce the class of the offense
may nevertheless raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant
formed the intent to kill upon, and carried it out after, deliberation and premeditation." (People v. Valentine, supra,
28 Cal.2d 121, 132.) It is argued, with merit, that the jury
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was not instructed as to what constitutes sufficient provocation
to reduce the crime from mnrder of first degree to that of
the seeond degree. The jury was instructed fully, in accordance with the recent decisions of this court, as to both first
and seeond degree murder. In the instruction on the difference between first and second degree murder, the jury was
told that "It [murder of the first degree] must be formed
upon a pre-existing reflection and not ttpon a sudden heat
of passion or provocation or other circumstance sufficient to
preclude deliberation and premeditation. . . . '' (Emphasis
added.)
In the Valentine case ( stlpra, 28 Cal.2d 121) there was a
quarrel immediately preceding the killing. In that case,
Grroneous instructions were given in several instances as the
court pointed out at page 130: "In three essential and fatal
respects the instructions given in this case resemble the
instructions condemned in People v. Thomas ( 1945), 25 Cal.
2d 880 [156 P.2d 7] : (1) 'l'he jury were told that the existence of a specific intent to kill (which, of course, exists in
voluntary manslaughter and in second degree murder as well
as in some types of first degree murder) constitutes a homicide
murder of the first degree; (2) the effect of provocation and
passion as ·reducing the class of a homicide from murder
to manslaughter was emphasized and the effect of provocation
and passion as possibly precluding or making doubtful the
formation of a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill
was ignored; and ( 3) the jury were told, in effect, that the
burden of proving circumstances which would mitigate the
offense from murder of the first to murder of the second
degree was upon the defendant." In the case at bar, no
complaint is made that the instructions given were erroneous,
but only that instructions on manslaughter and provocation
should have been given. From the facts as testified to by
defendants themselves, it would appear that they had discussed killing Stricker the night before the crime was committed and again on the day of the crime just before breakfast.
It would appear, from defendants' own story, that the crime
was either murder of the first degree, or a homicide committed
in self-defense and justifiable as such. There was here no
evidence of a sudden quarrel or any such passion as would
make ''doubtful the formation of a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill." (People v. Valentine, sttpra, 28 Cal.2d
121, 132.) The jury was fully and fairly instructed on the
law of self-defense and the fear necessary to justify a homicide.
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advised on the 1aw of selfafter
did not believe that ''the circumstances
such
as to excite the fears of a reasonable man
in a similar
position . . . '' it could do no less than follow the law as set
forth in the instruetions relating to murder of the first degree,
since defendants' own testimony
the theory that
they were provoked, or so under the influence of passion as
to make it doubtful that they could have formed a deliberate
and premeditated intent to kilL [5] It is settled law that
instructions must be responsive to the issues which are determined by the evidence. The record here does not bring the
case within the factual situation presented by People v. Valentine, sttpra, where the killing was committed during a sudden
quarrel and where the deceased had been guilty of making
accusations against the defendant within a few moments of
the commission of the crime. In addition, other erroneous
instructions in the Valentine case added to the error heretofore discussed.
'We said in People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.
2d 880, 903 [156 P.2d 7], "Provocation of a kind, to a degree,
and under circumstances insufficient to fully negative or raise
a reasonable doubt as to the idea of both premeditation and
malice (thereby reducing the offense to manslaughter) might
nevertheless be adequate to negative or raise a reasonable
doubt as to the idea of premeditation or deliberation, leaving
the homicide as murder of the second degree; i.e., an unlawful
killing perpetrated with malice aforethought but witho1d
premeditat·ion and delibemtion.
"Murder of the second degree may be defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought
but which killing is not perpetrated by means of poison, or
lying in wait, or torture, is not wilful, deliberate and premeditated, and is not committed in the perpetration of or
attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or
mayhem. (See Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.) It is apparent from
the facts previously recited that the homicide in this case,
if it was murder at all, was murder of the second degree
unless the killing ·was 'wilful, deliberate and premeditated.'
The existence of provocation and its extent and effect, if
any, upon the mind of defenclant in rdation to premeditation and deliberation in fonm'ng the specific intent to kill,
as well as in regard to the existence of malice (Pen. Code,
§ 188), constit1de questions of fact for the jury and they
should have been so advised." (Emphasis partially added.)
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In the Thomas case, as well as in the Valentine case, the
murder occurred during a sudden quarrel. In the Thomas
case, the question was presented whether the defendant had
previously formed an intent to kill. In both cases, manslaughter instructions were given; in both cases, murder of
the first degree was enoneously defined for the jury ; in both
cases there were doubtful instructions concerning the burden
of proof; in both cases, the evidence was in substantial conflict. In the case at bar, there is no conflict in the evidence;
no instruction was given on manslaughter; no sudden quarrel
was involved; the instruction on murder of the first (as well
as of the second degree) was correct, and is not questioned.
The question for determination, as it appears to us, is whether
the record shows any evidence which would warrant an instruction informing the jury that provocation insufficient to
reduce the crime from murder of the first degree to manslaughter might yet be sufficient to reduce the crime from
first degree murder to that of the second degree. [6] We
are of the opinion that the evidence of a quarrel the day
before the killing, together with the evidence showing that
the deceased had procured a knife and had threatened to
kill the defendants justified the instruction on self-defense
which was defendants' theory and which was fully given to
the jury. [4b] We are unable to see how the evidence of
the quarrel and the threat on the day before the killing
together with the facts surrounding the crime (the lack of
conversation between the deceased and the defendants; the
fact that decedent was seated, with his back to the defendants,
playing dominoes with other prisoners) could be considered
as sufficient to support a verdict of second degree murder.
In other words, we feel that the facts of this case would not
support a conclusion, or justify an instruction, to the effect
that there was sufficient provocation to reduce the degree of
the crime to second degree murder. The facts show that the
killing was either done in self-defense, or that it was a deliberate and premeditated murder.
In view of the evidence presented, the . errors complained
of are not of sufficient gravity to have resulted in a miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%) and thus warrant
a reversal of the judgments.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments and orders denying defendants' motions for a new trial are therefore affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

